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JUDICIAL REVIEW OF RETROACTIVE RULEMAKING: HAS
GEORGETOWN NEGLECTED THE PLASTIC REMEDIES?
It is when things go wrong that the retroactive statute often becomes indis-
pensible as a curative measure; though the proper movement of law is for-
ward in time, we sometimes have to stop and turn about and pick up the
pieces. 1
Judicial distrust for retroactive legislation2 antedates Anglo-American
jurisprudence.3 Nevertheless, while courts have not universally sanc-
tioned retroactive laws, retroactivity has become an accepted component
of our judicial system.4 Originally a doctrine of equity,5 retroactivity has
developed haphazardly, evoking hostility from the judiciary.6 Courts
1. L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 53 (rev. ed. 1969).
2. Justice Story pointedly described retroactive legislation: "Upon principle, every statute,
which takes away or impairs vested rights acquired under existing laws, or creates a new obligation,
imposes a new duty, or attaches a new disability, in respect to transactions or considerations already
past, must be deemed retrospective .... " Society for the Propagation of the Gospel v. Wheeler, 22
Cas. 756, 767 (C.C.D.N.H. 1814) (No. 13,156) (Story, J.). See also CORWIN, THE TWILIGHT OF
THE SUPREME COURT, A HISTORY OF OUR CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 199 n. 16. (1935) (describing
retroactive legislation as "legislation which operates upon past acts from a time anterior to its pas-
sage"). The constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws has always been limited to criminal
law and has never been extended to civil or regulatory law. See Davis, Administrative Rules-Inter-
pretative, Legislative, and Retroactive, 57 YALE L.J. 919, 944 (1948) [hereinafter Davis, Administra-
tive Rules]. Therefore, discussion of ex post facto laws is beyond the scope of this Note.
3. See Smead, The Rule Against Retroactive Legislation: A Basic Principle of Jurisprudence, 20
MINN. L. REV. 775, 776 (1936).
The bias against retroactive laws is an ancient one ....
In so far as the principle found its way into the law of the United States, it took the same
form as a rule for construction of statutes, but when united with the doctrine of vested
rights it was identified with the natural law and found its way into the system of constitu-
tional limitations on governmental power.
Id. at 776.
4. See infra notes 27-30 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 22-23, 51-79 and accompanying text.
6. One scholar has noted that the ambiguous phrases which courts have used to articulate
their disapproval of retroactive laws often are not grounded on sound reasoning.
[P]hrases [such] as "a violation of fundamental principles," "repugnant to the common
principles of justice and civil liberty," "against natural right," "contrary to the principles
of general jurisprudence," and other similar epithets applied to such legislation which is
held invalid, are but blinds to cover up the mental indisposition or inability to see the
problem through, expressions of vague feeling that the law is very bad without being able
to say just why.
Smith, Retroactive Laws and Vested Rights 11, 6 TEX. L. REV. 409, 409 (1928) [hereinafter Smith,
Retroactive Laws II] (citing Smith, Retroactive Laws and Vested Rights I, 5 TEX. L. REV. 231 (1927)
[hereinafter Smith, Retroactive Laws I]).
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and scholars are particularly critical of retroactive agency rules.7
To address increasingly complex societal problems, Congress delegates
substantial lawmaking authority to federal administrative agencies.8
Thus, one of the most distinctive and troublesome aspects of administra-
tive law is the great discretion agencies possess in filling statutory inter-
stices.9 To check this virtually unbridled agency discretion, Congress
7. Perhaps one reason why courts disfavor retroactive rulemaking is because it vests broad
authority in what may be politically unaccountable entities. See Davis, Administrative Rules, supra
note 2, at 944-45. Davis stated that "[r]etroactive rules involve all the difficulties of retroactive
statutes, complicated by the subordinate position of the agency, by the theoretical distinction be-
tween legislative and interpretative rules, and by the various doctrines concerning the authoritative
weight of interpretative rules." Id. at 944. Davis, however, recognized that "[s]ince legislative rules
are merely the administrative counterpart of statutes, the argument is plausible that legislative rules
may be retroactive whenever a statute may be retroactive, since the fairness or unfairness is the same
and judicial ideas of fairness are decisive." Id. Perhaps, then, because of subtle differences between
legislation and administrative rulemaking, retroactive rules, unlike retroactive statutes, are not
widely accepted. See generally 2 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 7:23, at 109 (2d ed.
1979) (noting that courts are hesitant to find implicit the power to promulgate retroactive rules). See
also Hochman, The Supreme Court and the Constitutionality of Retroactive Legislation, 73 HARM. L.
REV. 692 (1960) (exploring the due process implications of retroactive legislation). But cf Lee,
Legislative and Interpretive Regulations, 29 GEO. L. J. 1, 29 (1940) (arguing that an administrative
agency should be able to amend prior regulations retroactively, subject only to statutory limitations
and due process limitations, similar to those on retroactive legislation).
Distinguishing between retroactive legislative rules and retroactive interpretive rules may be diffi-
cult. Davis has recognized that "legislative rules are the product of a power to create new law, and
interpretative rules are the product of interpretation of previously existing law. Legislative rules
may change the law but interpretative rules merely clarify the law they interpret." Davis, Adminis-
trative Rules, supra note 2, at 928. This Note identifies the extent to which courts should treat
retroactive legislative rules differently than retroactive interpretive rules. See infra notes 27-32 and
accompanying text.
8. The exigent economic conditions during the Great Depression prompted Congress to pass
rush legislation, creating several new administrative agencies to enforce its laws. For a comprehen-
sive historical discussion of federal governmental responsibility, see Rabin, Federal Regulation in
Historical Perspective, 38 STAN. L. REV. 1189 (1986).
The Supreme Court had held such rush legislation an unconstitutional delegation of authority.
See Carter v. Carter Coal, 298 U.S. 238 (1936); Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S.
495 (1935); Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935). Subsequent reevaluation, however,
revealed that this "nondelegation doctrine" was an inappropriate measure to check congressional
delegation. The Court later began to tolerate rush legislation as a matter of pragmatic policymaking.
See, e.g., Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944). In fact, the Court has not invoked the
nondelegation doctrine in forty years. One plausible explanation for the demise of the doctrine is
that authorized agencies simply enforce politicized policy choices that, theoretically at least, are
outside the sphere of judicial action. See generally, R. CASS & C. DIVER, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW:
CASES AND MATERIALS 3-22 (1987). Similarly, Professor Davis has argued that the deterioration of
the nondelegation doctrine is attributable to the other viable "safeguards" courts may employ to
control broad agency discretion. See Davis, A New Approach to Delegation, 36 U. CM L. REV. 713
(1969).
9. For instance, enabling statutes are often silent as to whether an agency should proceed by
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provided "person[s] suffering a legal wrong because of agency action" a
right of judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA).' ° Hence, although administrative agencies might be less ac-
countable to a constituency than Congress or the President, judicial re-
view provides affected parties with adequate means to test the legitimacy
of agency action.
rulemaking or by case-by-case adjudication, and agencies have substantial discretion in choosing the
form with which to implement and establish policy. See generally Shapiro, The Choice of Rulemak-
ing or Adjudication in the Development of Administrative Policy, 78 HARV. L. REV. 921 (1965). One
commentator defines "rulemaking" as "the part of the administrative process that resembles a legis-
lature's enactment of a statute," and "adjudication" as "the part of the administrative process that
resembles a court's decision of a case." Davis, Administrative Rules, supra note 2, at 919. See, e.g.,
Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 628 (1935) (the FTC "acts in part quasi-
legislatively and in part quasi-judicially").
10. Pub. L. No. 89-554, 80 Stat. 381 (1976) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C §§ 551-559, 701-
706, 1305, 3105, 3344, 5372, 7521 (1988)). See 5 U.S.C § 702 (1988) (right of review). Section 706
of the APA sets forth the standards by which a reviewing court may overturn agency action. It
provides in pertinent part that:
To the extent necessary to decision and when presented, the reviewing court shall decide
all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, and deter-
mine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency action. The reviewing court
shall-
(2) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be-
(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law;
(B) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity;
(C) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory right;
(D) without observance of procedure required by law ....
5 U.S.C. § 706 (1988) (emphasis added). The APA does not dictate that an agency must act by rule
or order, or that it must proceed formally or informally. Rather, the APA requires that, once an
agency chooses one means over another, it must follow the procedures provided by the APA. For
example, if an agency proceeds by formal adjudication or rulemaking, the APA requires the agency
to keep a closed record and to base its decision on data compiled in that record. 5 U.S.C §§ 556-557.
A reviewing court can overturn an agency decision only if the agency's decision is not supported by
"substantial evidence." Id. § 706(2)(E).
On the other hand, if the agency proceeds informally, the APA does not expressly require that the
agency establish a formal record. The Supreme Court, however, has required agencies that proceed
informally to compile a factual record. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402
(1971). This requirement is commonly referred to as the "hard look" doctrine. See Greater Boston
Tel. Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 850 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1971). See also
Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 410 n.21 (1976). Agencies frequently proceed informally by
following the APA notice and comment procedure because it is the most efficient method of adminis-
tering the law. See 5 U.S.C § 553. See also R. CAss & C. DIVER, supra note 8, at 331.
Congress has also enacted judicial review provisions specifically tailored to an agency's unique
needs. See, e.g., Clean Air Act, ch. 360, § 307(b), Pub. L. No. 95-190, § 14(a)(79), (80), 91 Stat.
1404 (1977) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b) (1982)); Immigration and Nationality Act, ch. 477,
§ 106, Pub. L. No. 87-301, § 5(a), 75 Stat. 651 (1961) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C.A § 1105(a)
(West 1970 & Supp. 1989)).
11. For a thoughtful discussion and evaluation of recent proposals for judicial review of con-
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No court has decided that retroactive rules 2 are valid under the
APA, 3 which generally governs agency actions. The United States
Supreme Court recently had the opportunity to rule on this issue in
Bowen v. Georgetown University Hospital.4 In Georgetown, the Court de-
cided only that the enabling provision of the Medicare Act 5 does not
gressional delegations to administrative agencies, see McGowan, Congress, Court and Control of
Delegated Power, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 1119 (1977) (examining how judicial review controls broad
congressional delegations). Conceptually, the judiciary is powerless to substitute its judgment for
that of the executive branch. Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730 (1963) ("[C]ourts do not substi-
tute their social and economic beliefs for the judgment of the legislative bodies, who are elected to
pass laws."). Nevertheless, it is the function of the judiciary to interpret statutes and the law gener-
ally. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1 Cranch 1803). A judicial check is especially necessary on
administrative personnel who are making an increasingly large number of critical societal choices
and yet are often not accountable to a definable constituency. See Daughters of Miriam Center for
the Aged v. Mathews, 590 F.2d 1250, 1257 (3d Cir. 1978). See also infra note 81. Cf. INS v. Chada,
462 U.S. 919 (1983) (judicial check is necessary because the Constitution authorizes the legislative
branch only to amend the enabling statute and not to veto agency action). For a general discussion
of the legitimacy of administrative decision making, see K.C. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A
PRELIMINARY INQUIRY (1969); J.O. FREEDMAN, CRISIS AND LEGITIMACY: THE ADMINISTRA-
TIVE PROCESS AND AMERICAN GOVERNMENT (1978); Steward, The Reformation of American Ad-
ministrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1667 (1975). For two opposing approaches to judicial review of
administrative rules, compare 1 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE ch.5 (lst ed. 1958)
with B. SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW §§ 4.3-.4 (2d ed. 1982).
12. For purposes of clarity, this Note considers "rules" or "rulemaking" as informal, quasi-
legislative agency promulgations made pursuant to the APA notice and comment procedures and
"orders" or "adjudication" as quasi-judicial administrative policies issued in case-by-case adjudica-
tion. This Note argues that there is no compelling distinction between retroactive rules and retroac-
tive adjudication to warrant separate analytical frameworks. See infra notes 90-96 and
accompanying text.
One commentator has argued persuasively that the principles for analyzing the soundness of ad-
ministrative orders operate equally well when analyzing the validity of rules. See Levin, Identifying
Questions ofLaw in Administrative Law, 74 GEO. L. J. 1, 23 (1985). Levin argues that the distinction
between rulemaking and adjudication is "unfortunate" because the procedural devices an agency
uses to implement its program should not affect the dividing line between judicial and administrative'
authority. Id. Cf. Smith, Retroactive Laws II, supra note 6, at 414-15 ("The distinction between
retroactive laws made by the courts and those made by the legislatures, is a distinction of practicabil-
ity and not a distinction of justice. That the one should provoke judicial epithets while the other is
taken for granted, would indicate that the consideration of the subject has been sentimental rather
than scientific."). There is, of course, the strong common law tradition that judicial pronouncements
address only past conduct, whereas legislation establishes law for the future. See Smead, supra note
3, at 789 n.42.
Rather than focus on the means an agency employs to further its statutory mandate, this Note
analyzes the equitable effect of administrative retroactivity. Thus, a plausible assessment of the ret-
roactivity doctrine should begin with the threshold issue of whether equity calls for retroactivity,
13. Courts which have upheld retroactive rules have not done so under the APA's judicial
review provision, § 706. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1988). See infra notes 51-79, 90-96 and accompanying text.
14. 109 S. Ct. 468 (1988).
15. Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 291 (1965) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1395 (1982 &
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expressly authorize retroactive rulemaking by the Secretary of Health
and Human Services (HHS), 16 choosing not to reach the broader issue of
the validity of retroactive rules under the APA.17 In a concurring opin-
ion, however, Justice Scalia addressed at length the legitimacy of retroac-
tive rulemaking, concluding that retroactive rulemaking is not "a
permissible form of agency action under the particular structure estab-
lished by the APA."18
This Note rejects Justice Scalia's position19 and maintains that,
notwithstanding the disfavor for retroactivity, retroactive rules are a
valid form of agency rulemaking under the APA. Part I discusses the
context in which retroactive rules may be necessary and introduces the
Georgetown opinion. Part II then examines Supreme Court decisions
prior to the APA, focusing on the equities and due process review of
retroactivity, and discusses lower courts' review of retroactive rules. Fi-
nally, Part III analyzes and criticizes Georgetown, with particular em-
phasis on Justice Scalia's concurrence.
I. BACKGROUND OF RETROACTIVE RULEMAKING
Courts infer that regulated persons and industries are aware2° that
Supp. V 1987)). See 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(v)(1)(A)(ii) (1982) (authorizing the Secretary of the Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services to "provide for the making of suitable retroactive corrective
adjustments...").
16. 109 S. Ct. at 471, 474-75.
17. Id. at 475. The majority resolved the issue on statutory grounds, stating that it would not
recognize a statutory delegation of authority to include retroactive rulemaking without express Con-
gressional authorization. Id. at 471. This Note proposes that even if Congress fails expressly to
authorize retroactive rulemaking, it is within an agency's valid discretion to promulgate retroactive
rules, as long as the agency does not abuse its discretion under § 706 of the APA. See infra notes 80-
96 and accompanying text.
18. Id. at 480 (Scalia, J., concurring).
19. See infra notes 42-47, 145-80 and accompanying text.
20. See Federal Housing Admin. v. Darlington, Inc., 358 U.S. 84 (1958). Informal agency
action under the APA passes procedural due process muster because its procedural framework pro-
vides interested parties with an opportunity to be heard in the notice and comment process of infor-
mal rulemaking and a rudimentary opportunity to be heard in case-by-case adjudication.
Concerning informal rulemaking, § 553(b) of the APA requires agencies to publish the official text
of proposed regulations in the Federal Register. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (1988). This requirement theoret-
ically places interested parties on notice that the proposed regulations may affect their interests;
more generally, the notice and comment process allows public participation in policymaking. Id.
§ 553. Upon publication of the text in the FederalRegister, interested parties have an opportunity to
comment on the proposed rulemaking by submitting written data. Id. § 553(c). Following the no-
tice and comment period, the agency may publish a final regulation in the Code of Federal Regula-
tions (CFR), which should incorporate a concise statement of basis and purpose. Id.
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Congress may make occasional retroactive changes to effectuate its legis-
lative aims." Similarly, the Supreme Court has recognized that courts
should work with administrative agencies "through coordinated action"
to accomplish legitimate legislative ends.22 Thus, with respect to con-
gressional goals, the Court has recognized that administrative agencies
possess equitable powers similar to those of courts of equity and there-
fore must be free to make decisions without the burden of relying solely
on precedent. 23
A. The Necessity of Retroactive Rulemaking
Courts generally favor prospective application of rules when an agency
responds to actions of parties who have relied in good faith on prior
agency pronouncements.24 Such affected parties find retroactive
rulemaking unacceptable because it encroaches on past transactions and
impedes the ability to plan future conduct with reasonable legal cer-
tainty.25 Retroactive rules, however, may be necessary in some cases.
For instance, agencies occasionally must adjust public programs retroac-
tively in order to allocate limited funds fairly.26
21. See, e.g., FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134, 138 (1940) ("[u]nderlying the
whole [Communications Act] is recognition of the rapidly fluctuating factors ... and of the corre-
sponding requirement that the administrative process possess sufficient flexibility to adjust itself to
these factors") (Frankfurter, J.) (emphasis added); Silva v. Bell, 605 F.2d 978, 989 (7th Cir. 1979)
(upholding Immigration and Naturalization Service policy interpretation that retroactively reissued
20,000 new visas to erroneously deprived immigrants "in the interests of justice").
22. United States v. Morgan, 307 U.S. 183, 191 (1939). Justice Stone, writing for the five-
member majority, explained:
In construing a statute setting up an administrative agency and providing for judicial re-
view of its action, court and agency are not to be regarded as wholly independent and
unrelated instrumentalities of justice, each acting in the performance of its prescribed stat-
utory duty without regard to the appropriate function of the other in securing the plainly
indicated objects of the statute. Court and agency are the means adopted to attain the
prescribed end, and so far as their duties are defined by the words of the statute, those words
should be construed so as to attain that end through coordinated action. Neither body
should repeat in this day the mistake made by the courts of law when equity was struggling
for recognition as an ameliorating system ofjustice; neither can rightly be regarded by the
other as an alien intruder, to be tolerated if must be, but never to be encouraged or aided by
the other in the attainment of the common aim.
Id. (emphasis added). See also infra notes 60-67 and accompanying text.
23. Morgan, 307 U.S. at 191.
24. See, eg., NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 290-95 (1974).
25. Hochman, supra note 7, at 692. Cf I F. VOM BAUR, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
§ 493, at 491 (1942) (where original regulation inconsistent with statute or "unreasonable," an
"amended regulation becomes the primary and controlling rule in respect of the situation presented,
even as to past transactions").
26. It is important that administrative agencies possess the proper tools to handle the many
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol68/iss1/10
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Conceptually, there are two fundamental types of retroactive rulemak-
ing. An agency creates a curative rule when, without changing the sub-
stantive content of the rule, it retroactively remedies a procedural defect
in the existing rule.27 Curative rules are perhaps less offensive than
noncurative rules because they merely impose the same liability on the
affected party that would have attached had the agency promulgated the
original rule correctly;2" the affected parties should be on notice of that
specialized problems that arise unexpectedly. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 202 (1947).
Absolute proscription of retroactive rules could stifle the efficient administration of government.
Assuming an administrative agency has acted within the scope of its delegated authority, judicial
inquiry normally is limited to whether there has been an abuse of discretion. See 5 U.S.C § 706(2)
(1988) (scope of review under the APA). See also McGowan, supra note 11, at 1123-26 (discussing
judicial review of delegated rulemaking); Steward, supra note 11, at 1674-76 (same).
27. Note, Retroactive Operation of Administrative Regulations, 60 HARV. L. REv. 627, 629-30
(1947). It may be instructive to compare retroactive curative rules with retroactive curative statutes,
about which one commentator has noted: "The Court's favorable treatment of curative statutes is
probably explained by the strong public interest in the smooth functioning of government. It is
necessary that the legislature should be able to cure inadvertent defects in statutes or their adminis-
tration by making what has been aptly called 'small repairs." Hochman, supra note 7, at 705
(quoting Danforth v. Groton Water Co., 178 Mass. 472, 477, 59 N.E. 1033, 1034 (1901) (Holmes,
C.J.)) (emphasis added).
28. Then-Chief Judge Cardozo aptly explained this point in Crommelly v. McLean, 123 N.Y.
474 (1890):
If the thing omitted and which constitutes the defect be of such a nature that the legislature
might by prior statute have dispensed with, or if something has been done, or done in a
particular way which the legislature might have made immaterial, the omission or irregular
act may be cured by a subsequent statute.
Id. at 490 (emphasis added). See generally Hochman, supra note 7, at 703-06 (discussing curative
statutes). In supporting the validity of curative statutes, one commentator has noted:
Moreover, the individual who claims that a vested right has arisen from the defect is seek-
ing a windfall since, had the legislature's or administrator's action had the effect it was
intended to and could have had, no such right would have arisen. Thus, the interest in the
retroactive curing of such a defect in the administration of government outweighs the indi-
vidual's interest in benefiting from the defect.
Hochman, supra note 7, at 705-06 (emphasis added).
Cardozo's rationale arguably applies to curative rulemaking as well. There are two types of cura-
tive rules: "repromulgated" rules, or rules which courts have previously invalidated and are recre-
ated and applied retroactively; and "corrective" rules, or rules which retroactively adjust a
regulatory scheme, of which the agency intends to eliminate perceived defects. Cf. id. at 704-05
(recognizing two types of curative statutes).
Judicial review of corrective rules should focus on the affected parties' detrimental reliance on the
previous rule and the degree to which the new rule abruptly departs from well-settled agency prac-
tice. Cf. id. at 696 (concluding that although courts look at a party's reliance, no one factor is
determinative of validity of retroactive statutes). Perhaps, then, courts should review repromulgated
rules, cases of second impression, with greater scrutiny. The rationale underlying such a heightened
scrutiny analysis is that agencies often repromulgate rules in order to remedy an administrative
procedural error when the agency first promulgated the rule.
The APA requires agencies to promulgate final substantive rules within 30 days prior to each
Washington University Open Scholarship
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fact. Hence, with respect to curative rulemaking, judicial invalidation of
a merely procedural defect should not strip the agency of its congres-
sionally mandated authority to re-examine the faultily promulgated
rule.29
A second type of retroactive rule involves a substantive change of an
existing rule, which may or may not have a prior defect.30 Such a retro-
active rule may be necessary when a promulgated rule inadvertently or
unjustly enriches one regulated class at the expense of another."1 Never-
theless, the validity of such a retroactive rule may depend upon a weigh-
ing of congressional purpose and administrative necessity against
hardship to persons who have benefited under the prior rule.32 In short,
both types of retroactive rules are important components in the agency's
power to carry out Congress' delegation fairly and efficiently.
rule's effective date. If an agency fails to do so, it may then promulgate a second rule retroactively.
5 U.S.C. § 553(d) (1988). Courts have generally held, however, that there should be greater judicial
scrutiny when the agency has repromulgated the challenged rule with retroactive effect. See infra
notes 97-118 and accompanying text. The burden ofjustifying the retroactive application should be
placed on the agency. See infra notes 105-18 and accompanying text. See also Note, supra note 27,
at 628-30 (providing illustrations of curative rulemaking).
29. A retroactive curative rule was at issue in Edwards v. McMahon, 834 F.2d 796 (9th Cir.
1987). In Edwards, a regulated party, rather than the federal agency, sought retroactive adjustments
of welfare payments. Id. at 797-98. The district court compelled the Secretary of HHS to promul-
gate a retroactive rule to correct underpayments to former welfare-recipient petitioners. Id. at 798-
99. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit agreed that HHS had to make corrective payments to the former
recipients. Id. at 801. The court held that Congress clearly intended that HHS correct all underpay-
ments to current and former recipients under the Aid to Families with Dependent Children Program
(AFDC). Id. at 799-801. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-615 (1985). Although Edwards is unusual in that
the governed, not the government, sought to invoke retroactive rulemaking, it aptly illustrates how
retroactivity can prevent an unfair distribution of federal resources contrary to legislative intent.
30. Cf. Note, supra note 27, at 635 (concluding that "the ends of efficient administration may
be served by permitting regulations to operate retroactively, without a consequent imposition of
hardship," even if the agency substantively changes a prior defective regulation).
31. Suppose, for example, that the Department of Energy (DOE) promulgates a rule which sets
a new price index to control artificially the price of certain scarce petroleum products. Assume
further that the rule's purpose is to effectuate an economically uniform price of petroleum products
in different regions of the country. If, after one year in effect, the rule causes Florida's petroleum
costs to be twice those in Alaska, and if the agency predicts that the gap between the regions will
continue to widen, the DOE may have to promulgate another price index rule to fix (retroactively)
the price indexing. Such a retroactive rule assures that during a national economic crisis, one state's
economy does not flourish at the expense of another. This example demonstrates that, despite its
apparent unpopularity, retroactive rulemaking may be necessary to effectuate congressional response
to defective legislation.
32. See Note, supra note 27, at 635. Cf. Hochman, supra note 7, at 711 (reasonableness of




B. Bowen v. Georgetown University Hospital
While the Supreme Court has not held retroactive rules per se invalid,
it has never addressed specifically whether the APA authorizes an
agency to promulgate reasonable retroactive rules.3 3 In Georgetown Uni-
versity Hospital v. Bowen,34 the District of Columbia Circuit Court of
Appeals held that the APA does not authorize retroactive rulemaking.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari,35 creating the prospect that it
would clarify the scope of an agency's authority to promulgate rules
retroactively.
Justice Kennedy, writing for the unanimous Court in Bowen v.
Georgetown University Hospital,36 declined to reach the issue of whether
the APA authorizes retroactive rulemaking.37 In disposing of the case,
however, he adopted a rule of statutory construction applying to all ques-
tions of retroactive rulemaking authority and requiring the agency to re-
ceive congressional express authority to promulgate retroactive rules.38
The practical effect of this holding is the same as if the Court had ex-
pressly answered that the APA does not authorize retroactive rulemak-
ing.39 Nevertheless, the curious way in which the Court treated the
issue," as well as loopholes in the decision that the Court might later
33. See generally 2 K. DAVIS, supra note 7 at 109 ("[R]etroactive rules are valid if they are
reasonable but are invalid if their retroactivity is unreasonable in the circumstances.").
34. 821 F.2d 750, 757 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
35. 485 U.S. 903 (1988).
36. 109 S. Ct. 468 (1988).
37. 109 S. Ct. at 475 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("I find it incomplete to discuss general principles
of administrative law without reference to . . . The Administrative Procedure Act"). The D.C.
Circuit had ruled, as an alternative holding, that the APA generally proscribes retroactive rulemak-
ing. 821 F.2d at 757.
38. 109 S. Ct. at 471 ("[A] statutory grant of legislative rulemaking authority will not, as a
general matter, be understood to encompass the power to promulgate retroactive rules unless that
power is conveyed by Congress in express terms.") While it did not proscribe retroactive rules per
se, the Court's holding unduly narrows agency discretion. This Note argues that the Georgetown
Court has created the impractical requirement that Congress amend enabling legislation for each
agency that deems a retroactive rule necessary. See infra notes 142-44 and accompanying text.
39. As the APA merely fills in the gaps of any agency's organic statute, GELLHORN & BOYER,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS IN A NUTSHELL 245 (1981), it gives the agency authority
whenever the organic statute is silent on the issue. To cancel the APA's grant of authority, as well as
to add to that grant, therefore, Congress expressly must address the issue in the individual agency's
organic statute. Hence, by adopting the rule of statutory construction that Congress must expressly
authorize retroactive rulemaking for such power to exist, the Georgetown Court implicitly has held
that the APA does not offer any retroactive rulemaking authority.
40. One curiosity results from the fact that the new rule of statutory construction announced in
Georgetown never was briefed officially before the Court. See infra note 139.
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exploit,4 leave open the possibility that it may decide differently a later
case that again presents the APA retroactivity question.
In a concurring opinion, 2 Justice Scalia specifically agreed with the
D.C. Circuit that the APA does not authorize retroactive rulemaking.43
Scalia based much of his opinion on the APA's definition of "rule," 44
which he read as requiring that a rule only have future effect.4 5 Scalia
also refuted the government's reliance on retroactivity case law46 and its
analogy to retroactive legislation, which has withstood constitutional
attack.4 7
II. AN HISTORICAL LOOK AT JUDICIAL REVIEW
OF RETROACTIVE RULES
Historically, courts have reviewed retroactive rulemaking by agencies
only for its appropriateness in the specific situation, apparently assuming
that Congress gave agencies the power generally to make retroactive
rules when needed.a In so reviewing agency action, courts appear to be
divided in the standards they impose: some courts use a very deferential
approach in reviewing the action, treating the agency's choice as if it
were a question of discretion; 9 others scrutinize more closely, as if re-
viewing a question of law.50
41. Despite the broad statutory construction language drafted by Justice Kennedy early in the
opinion, the decision contains less sweeping pronouncements elsewhere. See infra note 140,
42. 109 S. Ct. at 475 (Scalia, J., concurring).
43. Id.
44. See 5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (1988).
45. 109 S. Ct. at 475-78 (Scalia, J., concurring). See infra notes 148-51 and accompanying text.
46. 109 S. Ct. at 478-79"(Scalia, J., concurring). See infra notes 164-72 and accompanying text.
47. 109 S. Ct. at 478-80 (Scalia, J., concurring). See infra notes 177-80 and accompanying text.
48. See, eg. Addison v. Holly Hill Fruit Products, Inc., 322 U.S. 607 (1944) (Court allows
agency to repromulgate invalidated rule with retroactive effect, considering only the fairness of such
retroactivity in the instant situation); Adams Nursing Home of Williamstown, Inc. v. Mathews, 548
F.2d 1077 (1st Cir. 1977) (court subjects a particular retroactive regulation to due process require-
ments only, ignoring any question whether agency has statutory authority to promulgate such a rule
at all).
1 49. See infra notes 80-96 and accompanying text. In administrative law, a reviewing court is
somewhat deferential to the agency when the court finds the appealed question one of discretion-
that is, one in which Congress has left the decision to the agency. See Levin, supra note 12, at 24-25.
Such review bears a close resemblance to the more deferential review accorded retroactive rulemak-
ing by some courts.
50. See infra notes 97-118 and accompanying text. A reviewing court will implement near-
plenary review of agency actions it determines to present questions of law-that is, questions to
which the court feels Congress has spoken specifically. This exacting review closely approximates
the less deferential review accorded retroactive rulemaking by some courts.
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RETROACTIVE RULEMAKING
A. Retroactive Rulemaking-Deferential Review
Two types of deferential review evolved for retroactive rulemaking:
review based on equitable principles and relaxed due process review.
L The Equitable Underpinnings of Retroactive Rules
Prior to the APA's enactment, the Supreme Court developed a body of
retroactivity law grounded upon principles of equity, and thereby al-
lowed an agency to promulgate retroactive rules when a court had struck
a prior agency rule for statutory deficiency. In articulating the equitable
nature of review, Justice Cardozo once described the equitable nature of
retroactive rules as "plastic remedies,"'" which furnish agencies with dis-
cretionary power to manage unique circumstances as they arise. 2
In Atlantic Coast Line Railroad v. Florida,53 the Supreme Court per-
mitted the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) to amend an "or-
der,"54 which controlled freight rates, to cure the regulation's procedural
defects, and to apply the amendment retroactively.5 After the first regu-
lation was struck for procedural defects, the agency repromulgated the
same rule-with procedures corrected. 6 Treating the action as one in
51. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Florida, 295 U.S. 301, 316 (1935) (Cardozo, J.).
52. Allowing agencies this equitable discretion is arguably requisite to the fair administration of
congressionally mandated regulatory duties. Hence, in reviewing retroactive rules, courts should
base their decisions on equitable considerations rather than the constraints of common-law
precedent.
53. 295 U.S. 301 (1935).
54. Note that the Atlantic Coast Court used the term "order" to describe what was actually
informal "rulemaking." Id. at 305. The "order" that the Court referred to was a directive from the
Railroad Commission of Florida regarding lumber freight charges. Id. It required that "voluntary
rates then in force" would "continue[] in effect as if officially prescribed." Id. The interchangeabil-
ity of these terms may indicate the limited utility any distinction would have on retroactivity analy-
sis. See Levin, supra note 12, at 9-14.
55. 295 U.S. at 306-08. Railroad carriers had collected freight charges in accordance with an
ICC order. The Court declared the order void, however, because the commission's report did not
contain the necessary factual findings. Id. at 306. See Florida v. United States, 282 U.S. 194 (1931)
(reversing district court's approval of the rates). After supplementing the report with new factual
evidence, the commission issued the same order. The Court confirmed the findings and approved the
second order in Florida v. United States, 292 U.S. 1 (1934). 295 U.S. at 307. In the second order,
the Commission explained that it issued the order because local rates resulted in revenue losses and
were thereby unjustly discriminatory against interstate commerce. Id. Shippers, the state of Flor-
ida, and Florida's Railroad Commission each sought restitution for part of the money paid while the
first order was in force. Id. at 307-08.
56. Id. at 305.
1990]
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equity,5 7 the Court decided that the new rule could apply retroactively,
and placed the burden on the regulated party to show the unreasonable-
ness of the Commission's retroactive rule. 8 Based upon the facts
presented by the ICC, the Court concluded that it would not offend eq-
uity or good conscience to uphold the regulation.5 9
Similar to its decision in Atlantic Coast Line, the Supreme Court al-
lowed the Secretary of Agriculture to issue a retroactive "order" in
United States v. Morgan.6" The district court had set aside an earlier
rule, which decreased future stockyard rates, for procedural defects.6"
While the Secretary proceeded to fix the rates according to the proper
procedures under the Packer and Stockyards Act,62 various marketing
agencies sought distribution of a court-established fund containing over-
payments under the prior excessive rates.6' The Court held that the Sec-
retary could determine proper rates antedating the period after the
second order only if barring retroactive action would cause "unjust and
unreasonable" rates to control, contrary to the intent of the underlying
statute.64
Writing for the Morgan Court, Justice Stone reasoned that a district
court, when reviewing an agency's action that conforms with the provi-
sions of its enabling act, "sits as a court of equity."' 65 The Court ex-
plained that the public interest may affect the extent to which a court
may fashion its remedies.66 Thus, Morgan indicates that the judiciary
57. Id. at 311-13. The Court considered the action one for restitution, because the agency
already had collected the rates required by the old regulation.
58. Id. at 318.
59. Id. at 317-18. Justice Cardozo noted that "[w]hat was injustice [in the unregulated rates] at
the date of the second order of the Commission is shown beyond doubt to have been injustice also at
the first. A situation so unique is a summons to a court of equity to mould its plastic remedies in
adaptation to the instant need." Id. at 316 (emphasis added).
60. 307 U.S. 183 (1939). Again, the Court used the term "order" to refer to what was actually
a "rule" of general application-the fixing of stockyard rates.
61. 307 U.S. at 185.
62. The Packer and Stockyards Act of 1921, ch. 64, 42 Stat. 159 (codified as amended at 7
U.S.C. §§ 181-229 (1988)). Section 206 of the act provides in pertinent part that "[the Secretary
shall] secure to patrons prescribed stockyard services at just and reasonable rates." See 7 U.S.C
§ 304 (1988).
63. When the district court set aside the first order, the court reinstated the original fees and
created a fund comprised of the excessive rates. 307 U.S. at 192-93.
64. Id. at 192, 196.
65. Id. at 191. Justice Stone stated that the district court, when it stays the execution of a rate
order and directs payment of excessive rates into the court, "assumes the duty of making disposition
of the fund in conformity to equitable principles." Id.
66. Id. at 194.
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and the agency must coordinate their action in order to attain the con-
gressional end prescribed in the agency's enabling statute.67
In Addison v. Holly Hill Fruit Products, Inc.,6 the Court extended the
principles it had enunciated in Morgan.69 Under the Fair Labor Stan-
dards Act,7 ° the Administrator of the Wage and Hour Division promul-
gated a rule defining which "area[s] of production" could be exempt
from regulation.7" The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals invalidated the
Administrator's definition for exceeding its statutory authority.72 How-
ever, the lower court upheld the rest of the exemption, thereby finding
the employers in Addison exempt from the requirements.73
The Supreme Court in Addison agreed that the Administrator's first
rule misconceived the bounds of his authority, but it refused to apply the
exemption without the definition intended to limit that exemption. 74 In-
stead, the Court held that the Administrator could repromulgate the rule
defining any exempted "area of production., 75 In the interest of fairness,
the Court remanded the matter to the district court with instructions to
stay the action until the agency made a valid determination consistent
with the congressional directive.76  The Court stated that retroactivity
should generally be avoided, unless doing so in effect would lead to retro-
67. Id. at 191.
68. 322 U.S. 607 (1944).
69. Id. at 620.
70. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, ch. 676, 52 Stat. 1060 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.
§§ 201-219 (1982 & Supp. V 1987)).
71. The act exempted from its minimum wage and maximum hour requirements employees in
specified occupations "within the area of production" defined by the Administrator. 322 U.S. at
608-09. Certain employees who were erroneously excluded from the act's beneficial coverage
brought suit challenging the rule. Id.
When first promulgated, the Administrator's rule utilized economic considerations in defining
exemptions under the Fair Labor Standards Act provision. Id. at 609, 614. The Fifth Circuit found
that the act permits the Administrator to define such areas geographically only. Id. at 618-19.
Thus, the rule exceeded the Administrator's authority.
72. See 322 U.S. at 608-09.
73. See id. at 618-19.
74. Id. at 618-20. The Court noted that the Administrator would not have passed the regula-
tion had he known it might operate as altered by the Fifth Circuit. Id.
75. Id. at 622-23. Although the Court upheld the rule's retroactivity, it expressed reservation
in endorsing retroactivity as a general rule. Id. at 622. The Court, however, did recognize that
retroactive rulemaking is legitimate in exceptional circumstances, "consonant with judicial adminis-
tration and fairness not to be balked by the undesirability of retroactive action .... Id.
76. Id. at 620. The Court refused to define the term "area of production." Id. at 619. In
permitting the agency to promulgate the second rule retroactively, the Addison Court presumed that
the agency would retrospectively act as conscientiously within the powers charged by Congress as it
would have done initially, had it acted within its statutory power. Id. at 620.
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activity that conflicts with statutory and regulatory design. 77 The Addi-
son Court suggested that, where circumstances dictate, an agency may
"remold" a regulation consistent with a congressional directive.7 Thus,
Addison exemplifies the Court's willingness to permit an agency to mod-
ify retroactively a rule's substance in the interest of fairness and statutory
compliance.79 It is unclear, however, whether the principles of Addison
extend to the promulgation of retroactive rules where a court has not
found an original regulation unlawful.
2. Relaxed Substantive Due Process Review of Retroactive Rules
Pre-APA retroactivity decisions demonstrate that equitable principles
may justify retroactive application of rules. The Supreme Court yielded
to agency determinations, refusing to insist that an unlawful regulation
was an impotent regulation. 0 When parties have challenged retroactive
rules on due process grounds, many courts also have deferred to the
agency's decision to act retrospectively.
The principles that courts have developed for assessing the due process
validity of retroactive statutes do not necessarily apply to retroactive
rules.8" Intuitively, however, due process analysis of retroactive legisla-
77. Id.
78. Id. at 620 (citing Morgan, 307 U.S. 183 (1939)).
79. One recent lower court case which arose in the midst of the oil crisis of the 1970s relied on
the Supreme Court's pre-APA retroactivity jurisprudence. In Mobil Oil Corp. v. DOE, 678 F.2d
1083 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1982), the Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals held that a retroac-
tive rule is valid if failure to apply the rule retroactively would thwart the statutory purpose. Id. at
1090.
In Mobil, the DOE sought to promulgate two rules previously invalidated on procedural grounds.
The court found it inappropriate to apply the rules retroactively because the DOE failed to show
that the retroactive rule was "necessary to fulfill a statutory design." Id. at 1090. The court, how-
ever, did state that "adminstrative agencies have the authority, under limited circumstances, to issue
retroactive rules," relying on Addison, Atlantic Coast Line, and Morgan. Id. at 1088-89. See supra
notes 53-78 and accompanying text.
In dicta, the Mobil court commented that the scope of an agency's authority is more limited when
promulgating a previously invalidated rule. Id. at 1088. However, the court also cited opinions
involving retroactive interpretive rules, which courts traditionally have given less deference. Id. at
1088 (citing Standard Oil v. DOE, 596 F.2d 1029, 1063 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1978); General Tel.
v. United States, 449 F.2d 846, 863 (5th Cir. 1971)).
80. See, eg., United States v. Morgan, 307 U.S. 183, 196 (1939) ("ITlhe administrative agency
could prescribe rates only for the future, and the higher rates exacted were without the sanction of a
valid order. But ... the first administrative order was not a nullity.").
81. Retroactive rules may warrant greater scrutiny because, while Congressmen are directly
responsible to their constituents, administrators are insulated from the electoral process. For a the-
ory proposing circumstances in which retroactive legislation is justified, see Munzer, A Theory of
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tion may serve as an analogy for retroactive rules because Congress may
confer all of its power to an agency.82 Thus, sampling due process review
of retroactive legislation may cast some light upon what level of review
courts should employ when analyzing retroactive rules.
The Supreme Court has never held that retroactive legislation involves
a per se due process violation.83 To the contrary, the Court has held that
legislation readjusting rights and burdens is not unconstitutional solely
because it upsets otherwise settled expectations84 or because it creates a
new duty or liability based on past acts.8 The Court has consistently
maintained that retroactive socioeconomic legislation is constitutional if
it is both furthered by rational means and reasonable.86 When courts
review curative retroactive legislation,87 a primary consideration is the
strong public interest in facilitating the smooth functioning of govern-
ment.88 In any event, retroactivity is arguably the proper remedy in the
Retroactive Legislation, 61 TEX. L. REv. 425 (1982). See also 2 SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION §§ 41.01-41.22 (4th ed. 1986).
82. At one time the Supreme Court articulated a doctrine limiting Congress' ability to delegate
its authority to an agency. The Court later refuted this "nondelegation" doctrine. See supra note 8.
83. See Satterlee v. Matthewson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 380, 413 (1829) ("[r]etrospective laws which
do not impair the obligation of contracts, or partake of the character of ex post facto laws, are not
condemned or forbidden by any part of [the Constitution]").
The Supreme Court has consistently found retroactive legislation constitutionally permissible. Be-
cause the substantive effects of retroactive legislation and quasi-legislative rules are similar, retroac-
tive rules therefore might be constitutional. For a decision that agrees with this comparison, see
Adams Nursing Home of Williamstown, Inc. v. Mathews, 548 F.2d 1077 (1st Cir. 1977), discussed
infra notes 90-96 and accompanying text.
84. See, e.g., Fleming v. Rhodes, 331 U.S. 100 (1947); Carpenter v. Wabash R.R., 309 U.S. 23
(1940).
85. See, e.g., Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742 (1948) (renegotiation and recapture of
excess profits on government contracts); Welch v. Henry, 305 U.S. 134 (1938); Funkhouser v. Pres-
ton Co., 290 U.S. 163 (1933); Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co. v. United States, 810 F.2d
726 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987) (upholding the constitutionality of a CERCLA
provision that retroactively affects the rights of past property owners).
86. See, e.g., Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717, 729 (1984); Usery v.
Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1 (1976) (notwithstanding retroactivity, there is a presump-
tion of constitutionality and plaintiff must show that government acted arbitrarily or irrationally).
See also Chase Sec. Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304 (1945); League v. Texas, 184 U.S. 156 (1902).
87. For a discussion of curative retroactive legislation, see supra note 27.
88. See Hochman, supra note 7, at 705. One should note that the government's interest has less
weight when a retroactive law frees the government itself, rather than private parties, from obliga-
tion. See, e.g., Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330, 350-51 (1935) (dealing with government's own
obligations); Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571, 576-77 (1934) (Congress precluded from cancel-
ing war risk life insurance policies). Recall, however, that retroactivity is suspect because it over-
turns vested property rights and impedes the ability of those affected to plan conduct with reasonable
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interest of fairness.8 9
Similar concerns should apply in the context of retroactive rulemak-
ing. For example, in Adams Nursing Home of Williamstown, Inc. v. Ma-
thews,9° the First Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the constitutionality
of a retroactive rule promulgated by the Secretary of Health, Education
and Welfare because the rule affected only "modest" interests and expec-
tations.91 In Adams, the Secretary promulgated a retroactive rule to re-
capture excessive payments it made to medicare providers.92 The Adams
court focused its inquiry solely on the due process implications of retro-
activity.93 The court weighed the affected party's reasonable expecta-
tions9 4 against the Secretary's intention to remedy a perceived abuse of
the medicare program, and concluded that the retroactive rule did not
violate the due process clause of the fifth amendment.95 To reach its
legal certainty. Commentators traditionally have regarded retroactive laws with suspicion. For in-
stance, one scholar has nbted:
That these [retroactive] laws were regarded as so subversive of justice as to call for express
constitutional prohibitions, not unnaturally suggests that any sort of legislative retroaction
should be looked upon with suspicion. Mr. Cooley observed that such laws were "exceed-
ingly liable to abuse," and Mr. Justice Story, that they are "generally unjust." Chancellor
Kent said that "a retroactive statute would partake in its character of the mischiefs of an ex
post facto law, as to all cases 'of crimes and penalties, and in every other case relating to
contract or property it would be against every sound principle."
Smith, Retroactive Laws 1I, supra note 6, at 413 (citations omitted). See supra notes 2, 3 and accom-
panying text. See also G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 500 (11th ed. 1985); Munzer, A The-
ory of Retroactive Legislation, 61 TEx. L. REV. 425 (1982); Slawson, Constitutional and Legislative
Considerations in Retroactive Lawmaking, 48 CAL. L. REv. 216 (1960).
89. See supra notes 51-79 and accompanying text.
90. 548 F.2d 1077 (1st Cir. 1977).
91. Id. at 1081-82.
92. Id. at 1078. The prior rulemaking scheme, designed to calculate "reasonable costs" in pro-
viding medicare services, proved subject to abuse. The Medicare Act authorized the Secretary to
determine the "reasonable costs" of medicare providers to assure that private patients do not bear
any of the expenses of medicare services. 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(v)(1)(A)(i) (1976). The Secretary origi-
nally promulgated a rule allowing providers to depreciate any capital assets used to serve medicare
patients and treat such assets as a cost of providing medical care. 548 F.2d at 1078. This system left
the providers the discretion to choose either straight-line or accelerated depreciation. Id. The Secre-
tary later changed the reimbursement scheme because some providers chose the accelerated method
to produce larger reimbursements in earlier years and then subsequently left the program. Id. The
Secretary restricted future use of the accelerated method and sought to recapture retroactively the
difference between the straight-line and accelerated methods. Id. See 20 C.F.R. § 405.415(d)(3)
(1975).
93. 548 F.2d at 1080-82.
94. The court gave little credence to the actual expectations of Adams, a nursing home, because
it determined that Adams' conduct, as well as that of other parties in its class, would not have
differed if the agency had applied the retroactive rule at issue from the start. Id. at 1078, 1081.
95. Id. at 1082. In its analysis, the court did not rely upon any of the equitable principles
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result, the court followed the directive of Supreme Court jurisprudence
concerning the constitutionality of retroactive legislation.96 Whether the
Adams court recognized the role of the agency in balancing the equities
or whether it merely applied relaxed due process review is of no conse-
quence. In either case, the Adams court recognized the need to defer to
an agency's discretion.
B. Retroactive Rulemaking-Intrusive Review
Many courts refuse to recognize that the decision to promulgate a ret-
roactive rule is a matter of agency discretion; these courts instead employ
more intrusive tests. In applying these tests, the courts re-examine the
underlying factual circumstances that prompted the agency initially to
choose retroactivity. The reviewing court thus substitutes its discretion-
ary judgment for that of the agency, rather than leave the balancing pro-
cess almost entirely to the agency like other retroactivity decisions.
97
The Sixth Circuit developed a three-prong test for reviewing a retroac-
tive rule in Mason General Hospital v. Department of HHS.98 The court
applied this test to invalidate a retroactive rule99 that the Secretary of
Health and Human Services promulgated to recover what the agency
developed by Addison or its predecessors. See id. at 1080-82; supra notes 51-79 and accompanying
text. Rather, the court simply deferred to the findings of the Secretary.
96. Id. at 1082 (citing Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1 (1976), for the proposi-
tion that the government is entitled to the benefit of any constitutional doubt).
97. See supra notes 51-79, 90-96 and accompanying text.
98. 809 F.2d 1220 (6th Cir. 1987).
99. The 1979 medicare malpractice rule was a "corrective measure" through which the Secre-
tary of Health and Human Services revised the medicare provider malpractice apportionment
system. 42 C.F.R. § 405.452(b)(1)(ii) (1985) (subsequently redesignated as 42 C.F.R.
§ 405.452(a)(1)(ii) (1985)). Under the pre-1979 system, HHS treated malpractice costs as one of
many overhead expenses which providers pooled and HHS reimbursed providers based on the prov-
iders' "utilization ratio." The Secretary based the utilization ratio on the provider's ratio of hospital
medicare patients usage to the total patient usage. Due to the precipitous increase in malpractice
insurance costs, as well as other economic factors, including inflation, the Secretary concluded that
HHS was paying a disproportionate share of malpractice insurance costs under the pre-1979 rules in
violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(v)(1)(A)(ii) (1972), which provided in part that the Secretary shall
promulgate regulations to "provide for the making of suitable retroactive corrective adjustments
where, for a provider of services for any fiscal period, the aggregate reimbursement produced by the
methods of determining costs proves to be either inadequate or excessive." 42 C.F.R.
§ 405.452(b)(1)(ii).
After concluding that the reimbursements HHS made to providers under the pre-1979 rule were
excessive, the Secretary eliminated malpractice insurance from inclusion in the general overhead
expenses and replaced it with a scheme based on the provider's "actual" claim-loss costs in malprac-
tice insurance arising from service to medicare patients. Id.
Washington University Open Scholarship
174 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 68:157
considered to be excessive payments it had made to medicare provider
hospitals.1°" The district court below invalidated a 1979 rule10 1 as "arbi-
trary and capricious" and an abuse of the Secretary's discretion.102 The
Secretary subsequently promulgated a retroactive rule in 1986, applying
retroactively through 1979.103 The Sixth Circuit, however, held that af-
ter the invalidation of the 1979 rule, the Secretary was not authorized to
apply the 1986 rule retroactively.' ° 4
The Mason court characterized the retroactivity issue as a question of
law, 05 regarding which the court would owe no overriding deference to
the agency's decision.106 In deciding by what standard to judge the
100. 809 F.2d at 1222, 1228. In Mason, the Secretary of HHS was authorized under
§ 1395x(v)(1)(A)(ii) to make "retroactive corrective adjustments." Id. at 1225 (quoting statute).
The Sixth Circuit joined six other circuits in invalidating the 1979 malpractice rule. See Bedford
County Memorial Hosp. v. HHS, 769 F.2d 1017 (4th Cir. 1985); Menorah Medical Center v. Heck-
ler, 768 F.2d 292 (8th Cir. 1985); DeSoto Gen. Hosp. v. Heckler, 776 F.2d 115 (5th Cir. 1985)
(reinstating district court's invalidation of rule); Lloyd Noland Hosp. & Clinic v. Heckler, 762 F.2d
1561 (11th Cir. 1985); St. James Hosp. v. Heckler, 760 F.2d 1460 (7th Cir.), cert denied, 474 U.S.
902 (1985); Abington Memorial Hosp. v. Heckler, 750 F.2d 242 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S.
863 (1985). But see Humana of Aurora, Inc. v. Heckler, 753 F.2d 1579 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 474
U.S. 863 (1985) (reversing district court and upholding Secretary's 1986 rule); Walter O. Boswell
Memorial Hosp. v. Heckler, 749 F:2d 788 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (raising serious questions regarding the
Secretary's rulemaking but ultimately remanding to agency).
101. The Secretary promulgated the 1979 malpractice rule to alter the method by which the
government compensates hospitals for a portion of malpractice insurance costs attributable to medi-
care patients. 809 F.2d at 1222.
102. Id. at 1222. The district court based its invalidation on the Secretary's failure adequately to
consider relevant comments on the proposed rule. Id.
103. Id. at 1223.
104. Id. at 1231.
105. Id. at 1228. In employing the APA judicial review framework, the court purportedly ana-
lyzed the retroactivity issue as a question of due process, rather than as a possible abuse of discre-
tion. Id. at 1229. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A),(B) (1988). In treating the issue as a question of due
process, the court would be justified in conducting de novo review as it is a settled principle that
courts are the only authority on constitutional issues. See Levin, supra note 12, at 47-48. However,
for a more deferential due process review, see supra notes 90-96 and accompanying text.
Rather than defer to HHS, the Mason court exercised de novo review, balancing the Secretary's
statutory goals against the hospitals' private interests. 809 F.2d at 1230. First, the court noted that
the 1986 formula was significantly similar to the 1979 formula, and that both marked a substantial
departure from the prior utilization method. Id. at 1231. This fact, for the court, raised serious due
process questions. Id. Second, the court found no overriding statutory interest in employing the
new utilization method. Id.
106. Id. at 1224. The court of appeals did not employ the same standard of review as the district
court below but instead found the question of retroactivity within its jurisdiction and carefully re-
viewed the Secretary's rule. Id. at 1223-24. In short, the Mason court substituted its judgment for
that of the agency. The court reached this result by broadly interpreting a statutory provision of the
Medicare Act, which entitles a provider to obtain expedited judicial review of any action "which
involves a question of law." See 42 U.S.C. § 1395oo(f)(I) (1982). The court ignored a second perti-
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agency in its retroactive rulemaking, the court considered three cases.
The first, Retail, Wholesale and Department Store Union v. NLRB, 107
involved judicial review of an agency adjudication.1 °8 In Retail Union,
the D.C. Circuit identified several factors it would consider in reviewing
an order that the agency intends to apply retroactively.0 9 The Mason
court proceeded to cite Mobil Oil Corp. v. Department of Energy" 0 and
Georgetown University Hospital v. Bowen."I 1 These cases both concerned
retroactive rules rather than adjudicative orders." 2 Based on its assess-
ment of those cases, the Mason court decided to apply a stricter standard
than the one imposed in Retail Union," 3 due to its perception that
rulemaking should be prospective whenever possible.114
nent provision which grants the Secretary authority to make "suitable retroactive corrective adjust-
ments." 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(v)(1)(A)(ii) (1982).
107. 466 F.2d 380 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
108. Id. at 393. In Retail Union, the order at issue required employers to give striking employees
"fair consideration" for reinstatement until finding other suitable work. The D.C. Circuit struck
down an attempt by the NLRB to apply the same order retroactively. The court held that the
hardship which the order placed on the employer who had relied on the previous NLRB policy
outweighed the public ends sought to be achieved by the new policy. Id.
In its decision, the Retail Union court relied heavily on the Supreme Court's decision in SEC v.
Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947) (allowing the SEC to apply a previously invalidated adjudica-
tory order retroactively). 466 F.2d at 388-91.
109. The D.C. Circuit provided five "equitable factors" that might help courts resolve the retro-
activity problems in the adjudication context:
(I) whether the particular case is one of first impression, (2) whether the new rule repre-
sents an abrupt departure from well established practice or merely attempts to fill a void in
an unsettled area of law, (3) the extent to which the party against whom the new rule is
applied relied on the former rule, (4) the degree of the burden which a retroactive order
imposes on a party, and (5) the statutory interest in applying a new rule despite reliance of
a party on the old standard.
466 F.2d at 390.
110. 678 F.2d 1083 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1982).
111. Medicare & Medicaid Guide (CCH) 35,341 (D.D.C. April 11, 1986), aff'd, 821 F.2d 750
(D.C. Cir. 1987), aff'd 109 S. Ct. 468 (1988).
112. Mason, 809 F.2d at 1227-28.
113. Id. at 1228.
114. Id. The Mason court's assertion that retroactive rulemaking deserves closer scrutiny does
not go unchallenged. Courts have utilized the Retail Union test in the context of rulemaking, possi-
bly because of the parallels between retroactive adjudication and other forms of administrative retro-
activity, such as retroactive rulemaking. See New England Tel. & Tel. Co. v. FCC, 826 F.2d 1101,
1112 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (applying Retail Union to review a retroactive interpretive rule); Maxcell
Telecom Plus, Inc. v. FCC, 815 F.2d 1551, 1555 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (applying SEC v. Chenery Corp.,
332 U.S. 194 (1947), to uphold a retroactive interpretive rule); Leigl v. Webb, 802 F.2d 623, 628 (2d
Cir. 1986) (Oakes, C.J. dissenting) (applying Chenery to argue against striking a retroactive interpre-
tive rule); Aliceville Hydro Associates v. FCC, 800 F.2d 1147 (D.C. Cir. 1986); Pennzoil Co. v.
DOE, 680 F.2d 156, 175 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1982) (reviewing a retroactive interpretive rule),
cert. dismissed, 459 U.S. 1190 (1983); Mapco Inc. v. Carter, 573 F.2d 1268 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App.
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The court proceeded to expound a three-part balancing test, designed
to assess the permissibility of retroactive rules: (1) the degree to which
the originally promulgated rule was capricious or an abuse of discretion;
(2) the existence, duration and departurejfrom well-settled practice; and
(3) the extent to which the rule was integral to effectuate the statutory
purpose.115
Under its own framework, the Mason court concluded that the 1986
rule was invalid as applied retroactively to reporting periods beginning in
1979.116 In formulating its test, the court followed the general directive
of Addison v. Holly Hill Fruit Products, Inc. 117 Unlike Addison, however,
the Mason court placed less emphasis on whether the rule was necessary
to fulfill the statutory design. Instead, the Mason court independently
balanced the equities at hand and concluded that retroactivity was un-
1978) (same); National Helium Corp. v. FEA, 569 F.2d 1137, 1145 n.18 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App.
1977) (same). But cf Texaco, Inc. v. DOE, 795 F.2d 1021, 1025-26 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1986)
(standard of review of agency's retroactive "action" is whether "decision was reasonable in the cir-
cumstances") (finding Retail Union factors "useful," but not determinative). See supra note 108.
Such parallels are easily discernible. First, often substantive curative rules, like adjudicatory or-
ders, involve cases of first impression. Second, a corrective measure in a cost allocation scheme
might depart abruptly from settled practice just as an adjudicatory order might overrule settled
precedent. Third, it is plausible that affected parties could rely on a rule which an agency subse-
quently determines to be inefficient, as could a party to an adjudication. Fourth, corrective rules,
like retroactive orders, impose some unforeseen burdens on the regulated parties. Finally, despite
any reliance interests, a retroactive corrective rule, like a retroactive order, may be necessary to fulfill
a statutory design.
From the perspective of the affected parties, while they do not have the benefit of a hearing before
an administrative law judge in the rulemaking process, they do get some forum from which to be
heard in the notice and comment required by the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1988).
115. 809 F.2d at 1228. Mason's test is more intrusive than the five-part test of Retail Union in a
number of ways. The question of the arbitrariness of the original rule, ignored in Retail Union,
illustrates the Mason court's willingness to scrutinize the good faith of the agency in repromulgation.
Also, whereas the Retail Union test inquires into the statutory interest in applying the new rule, the
Mason decision asks whether the rule is integral to the statutory purpose. Id.
116. Id. at 1231. The Mason court distinguished "repromulgated" rules from "gap filling" rules
in retroactivity analysis. Id. at 1228. The consideration of factors particularly relevant to repromul-
gated retroactive rules may set Mason apart from other courts which may not have appreciated this
subtle distinction. As the court's test illustrates, the latter cases simply ask whether there was detri-
mental reliance, while the former involve questions aimed at why the rule was invalidated in the first
place. The Mason test is the first to distinguish, and analyze separately, repromulgated rules and, in
this respect, should prove useful to reviewing courts. One district court that applied the Mason
factors to assess the validity of a retroactively repromulgated rule also considered the Chenery and
Retail Union tests. See Leila Hosp. and Health Center v. Bowen, 661 F. Supp. 397, 403 (W.D. Mich.
1987) (promulgating retroactive rules is frequently within the delegated authority of an agency.)
The Sixth Circuit subsequently reversed the district court. See Leila Hosp. and Health Center v.
Bowen, 873 F.2d 132 (6th Cir. 1989).
117. 322 U.S. 607 (1944). See supra notes 68-79 and accompanying text.
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necessary. 18 The Mason decision makes clear that the court was not
willing to defer to the Secretary's decision to promulgate a retroactive
rule.
III. BOWEN V. GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY HOSPITAL
In Bowen v. Georgetown University Hospital,1" 9 the Secretary of the De-
partment of Health and Human Services (HHS) promulgated a retroac-
tive rule 2 ° designed to collect, retrospectively, excessive reimbursement
payments that the government had made to medicare service provid-
ers.' 2 ' In 1979, the Secretary promulgated a "cost-limit" rule.22 that es-
tablished an equation for measuring the amount medicare providers
could recover as reimbursement for reasonable costs incurred. The cost-
limit equation included a "wage index" reflecting the average salary
levels of hospital employees in a geographic area.'23 In 1981, the Secre-
tary amended the cost-limit rule to provide a new method for calculating
provider costs.' 24 The 1981 rule excluded federal government hospitals
from the wage-index calculation.' 25 Because the Secretary considered
this a "minor" technical change,' 26 the HHS promulgated the final rule
without a notice and comment period as required by the APA. 127 Never-
118. 809 F.2d at 1228-29. The court emphasized that retroactivity "[in the context of adminis-
trative rulemaking, [trivializes] the procedures mandated by the Administrative Procedure Act." Id.
at 1226.
119. 109 S. Ct. 468 (1988).
120. 49 Fed. Reg. 46,495 (1984).
121. A 1972 amendment to the Medicare Act empowered the Secretary to define "reasonable
costs" for routine medical services in order properly to reimburse providers. Social Security Amend-
ments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603, § 223(b), 86 Stat. 1393 (amending 42 U.S.C § 1395x(v)(1)(A)).
The act defines "reasonable cost" as the "cost actually incurred, excluding therefrom any part of
incurred cost found to be unnecessary in the efficient delivery of needed health services." 42 U.S.C.
1395x(v)(1)(A) (1982). This section authorizes the Secretary to establish limits on provider costs.
Id. Pursuant to this authority, in 1974 the Secretary began publishing schedules of the limits placed
on reimbursable hospital costs. 109 S. Ct. at 470. The Secretary used informal rulemaking as the
means to implement this program.
122. 44 Fed. Reg. 31,806 (1979). The Secretary intended the 1979 cost-limit rule to apply pro-
spectively to cost accounting periods beginning on or after July 1, 1979. Id. The Secretary promul-
gated the 1979 rule to furnish a formula for calculating the cap on reimbursable costs. Id.
123. Id.
124. 46 Fed. Reg. 33,637 (1981).
125. Id. The 1979 wage index included data from federal government hospitals. In the final
notice of this change in the wage index, the Secretary stated that the amendment would "help im-
prove the accuracy of the wage index adjustment [because federal hospitals] typically use national
pay scales [that] ... do not necessarily reflect area wage levels." Id. at 33,639.
126. Id. at 33,640.
127. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (1988).
Washington University Open Scholarship
178 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 68:157
theless, the District Court for the District of Columbia invalidated the
1981 rule on the ground that it was arbitrary and capricious.1 28
In 1984, the Secretary repromulgated the wage-index rule and applied
it retroactively to 1981.129 The Secretary employed retroactive rulemak-
ing to recoup the money the government previously had paid to provid-
ers in compliance with the district court's order invalidating the 1981
wage-index rule. 130  Seven hospitals in the District of Columbia chal-
lenged the Secretary's authority to promulgate the retroactive rule under
the APA and the Medicare Act. 131 The Secretary argued that the gov-
ernment was entitled to correct retroactively the procedural defect in the
1981 rulemaking. 132 The Court, in a unanimous decision with one con-
currence, struck the Secretary's retroactive rule. 133
128. Several hospitals in the District of Columbia brought suit, alleging a violation of the APA's
notice and comment procedure. See Saint Cloud Hosp. v. Heckler, No. 83-0223 (DD.C. May 2,
1983) (remanded to Secretary to allow comments on the proposed change and in the interim settled
appellee's accounts with the original schedule); District of Columbia Hosp. Ass'n v. Heckler, No. 82-
2520 (D.D.C. May 2, 1983).
129. 49 Fed. Reg. 46,495 (1984). Having acknowledged the invalidity of the 1981 rule, see 48
Fed. Reg. 39,998 (1983), the Secretary published a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in which he
proposed to "reissue the 1981 wage-index rule." 49 Fed. Reg. 6175 (1984). After hearing objections
from commentators on this proposed retroactive change, the Secretary repromulgated, verbatim, the
1981 wage-index rule. The proposed rule unambiguously provided that it would apply retroactively.
49 Fed. Reg. 46,495 (1984) (final notice "affirms the use of the wage index that was used to calculate
the 1981 schedule of limits on hospital per diem inpatient general routine operating costs [and ap-
plies] to costs reporting periods beginning on or after July 1, 1981 ..
130. After repromulgating the 1981 rule retroactively, the Secretary refused to change the prov-
iders' wage limits for the 1982 and 1983 fiscal years and accordingly refused to alter the providers'
reimbursement under the Medicare Act. 49 Fed. Reg. 46,495 (1984).
131. 109 S. Ct. at 470-71. As a result of the 1984 rule, the Secretary demanded the return of
over $2 million in reimbursement payments from the hospitals. Id. at 471. The hospitals sought
judicial review in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia under § 702 of the
APA. See 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1988). They further claimed that the Medicare Act provided no author-
ity for the retroactive rule. The Social Security Amendments of 1972 authorized the Secretary to
make "suitable retroactive corrective adjustments" if, in the Secretary's judgment, the reimburse-
ment is either inadequate or excessive. The Secretary's task is to measure accurately the proportion
of the providers' total costs that are attributable to the "efficient" treatment of medicare recipients.
This provision therefore delegates power to the Secretary to make, in his or her judgment, "correc-
tive adjustments" when it appears that the system is not functioning effectively.
132. 109 S. Ct. at 472. The district court granted the hospitals' motion for summary judgment
and the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed. 821 F.2d 750 (1987). The court of appeals concluded
that the Secretary's asserted exception to the requirement that legislative rules operate prospectively
only was at odds with the basic tenets of administrative law. Id. at 757. The court held, alterna-
tively, that neither the APA nor the Medicare Act authorizes retroactive rulemaking. Id.
133. 109 S. Ct. at 475, 480.
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A. The Court's Rule of Statutory Construction
Writing for the Georgetown Court, Justice Kennedy adopted a rule of
statutory construction-based on the general disfavor for retroactivity-
that requires express congressional authorization for retroactive
rulemaking. 134 After reviewing the statutory language and the legislative
history behind the cost-limit provision, the Court concluded that Con-
gress did not explicitly authorize the Secretary to promulgate retroactive
rules.13 5 Because the Court decided the case narrowly on the ground of
statutory construction, 136 it did not reach the broader issue of whether
the APA authorizes retroactive rulemaking.1
37
The sweeping nature of the rule of decision in Georgetown is open to
criticism. The Court neither affirmed nor denied the appellate court's
APA resolution of the case, but instead announced, almost arbitrarily, a
134. Id. at 471, 474. "Thus, congressional enactments and administrative rules will not be con-
strued to have retroactive effect unless their language requires this result." Id. at 471. See also supra
note 38. Several lower federal courts have followed Georgetown's requirement that Congress must
expressly authorize an agency to promulgate rules retroactively. See Hennepin County v. Sullivan,
883 F.2d 85, 93 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (regulations pursuant to retroactive adjustment provision of Medi-
care Act do not permit changes in methods of computing provider costs); Leila Hosp. & Health
Center v. Bowen, 873 F.2d 132 (6th Cir. 1989) (Secretary of HHS has no authority to promulgate
retroactive cost-limit rules under Medicare Act); Minnesota Hosp. Ass'n v. Bowen, 703 F. Supp. 780
(D. Minn. 1988) (retroactive corrective adjustment provision of Medicare Act intended to apply to
case-by-case adjustments). In a concurring opinion, however, Justice Scalia may have been more
permissive in his interpretation of the requisite statutory authority. He stated:
It may even be that implicit authorization of particular retroactive rulemaking can be found
in existing legislation. If, for example, a statute prescribes a deadline by which particular
rules must be in effect, and if the agency misses that deadline, the statute may be inter-
preted to authorize a reasonable retroactive rule despite the limitation of the APA.
109 S. Ct. at 480 (Scalia, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
135. Id. at 474. The Court noted that the House and Senate Committee Reports directly address
the issue of retroactivity: " 'The proposed new authority to set limits on costs.., would be exercised
on a prospective, rather than retrospective, basis so that the provider would know in advance the
limits to Government recognition of incurred costs and have the opportunity to act to avoid having
costs that are not reimbursable'," Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 231, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 83 (1971),
reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 4989, 5070; and S. REP. No. 1230, 92d Cong.,
2d Sess. 188 (1972).
136. The Court did read the statute to permit the government to make retroactive corrections on
a case-by-case basis. The Court looked at the language of the cost-limit provision, which authorizes
adjustments for "a provider" when the calculated reimbursements are either too high or too low. Id.
at 472. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(v)(1)(A) (1982). The Court pointed out that such individual adjust-
ments are achieved through adjudication, and not rulemaking. 109 S. Ct. at 472.
137. See id. at 475 ("[t]he case before us is resolved by the particular statutory scheme in ques-
tion"). Nevertheless, as previously discussed, the implication of Justice Kennedy's sweeping lan-
guage would resolve, in practical terms, the APA question. See supra note 39.
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new rule of statutory construction. 38 Indeed, the rule was never briefed
officially before the Court.t 39 Furthermore, several ambivalent passages
in the Court's opinion cast doubt on the decision's breadth.' 40  The
Supreme Court might later use any one of these reasons, or all of them,
to limit Georgetown to its facts or overrule its chosen form of disposition.
The Georgetown rule also raises a number of questionable implications.
First, while the decision does not proscribe retroactive rulemaking per se,
it likely will eliminate many agencies' discretion to promulgate a retroac-
tive rule. No form of retroactivity review, whether based upon principles
of equity or due process, supports this result. 141
Second, the Georgetown holding is impractical because it curtails one
method by which an administrative agency may exercise its expertise and
take swift remedial steps in exigent circumstances. By requiring ad hoc,
express congressional authorization for retroactive rulemaking, George-
town limits the government's ability to rectify rules resulting in unjust
enrichment or unfair disbursement of funds through retroactive rulemak-
ing to instances where Congress amends the enabling legislation.'4 2 This
138. Id. at 471. Only Justice Scalia chose to address the grounds on which the D.C. Circuit
based its opinion. Id. at 475-80 (Scalia, J., concurring).
139. An amicus curiae brief suggested the statutory construction approach. See Supplemental
Brief for the Petitioner at 1-3, Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 109 S. Ct. 468 (1988) (No. 87-
1097). The Court did not accept that brief. 109 S. Ct. 43 (1988). In a reply brief to the amicus brief,
the Solicitor General attacked the rule, but this reply was conditioned on the Court's acceptance of
the amicus brief. Supplemental Brief for the Petitioner, supra, at 1. Notwithstanding the absence of
any position taken by the parties or amici in the case, the Court, or at least Justice Kennedy, clearly
took the proffered statutory construction rule to heart.
Should the court ever choose to reexamine the APA question presented in Georgetown, the ab-
sence of adequate briefing might offer a route by which the Court can loosen the bindings of stare
decisis.
140. For example, the Court stated: "The case before us is resolved by the particular statutory
scheme in question." 109 S. Ct. at 475. Even within its seemingly sweeping statement of the appro-
priate rule of construction, the Court does not speak in absolute terms. See id. at 471 ("as a general
matter" retroactive rulemaking authority must be express; "courts should be reluctant to find such
authority absent an express statutory grant") (emphasis added); id. at 474 (absence of express statu-
tory authority "weighs heavily" against ability to promulgate retroactive rules) (emphasis added).
Cf. id. at 480 (Scalia, J., concurring) (congressional authority may be implicit). This language may
allow the Court to distinguish or limit the Georgetown decision in futurd retroactive rulemaking
cases arising under different agency statutes.
141. See supra notes 51-94 and accompanying text. When the language of a statute expressly
delegates authority to an agency, courts owe no deference to the agency because the judiciary is the
final authority on statutory interpretation. Courts, therefore, can exercise their own judgment as to
whether an agency has fulfilled Congress' design. Levin, supra note 12, at 22.
142. In his concurring opinion, Justice Scalia stated that "if and when an agency believes that
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result runs afoul of the Court's reasoning of United States v. Morgan143
that courts and agencies should work cooperatively to achieve congres-
sional aims. 1 " As a practical matter, Congress cannot respond promptly
to such issues or foresee all complications that might create the need for
retroactivity.
B. Justice Scalia's Concurrence: Looking Beyond the Enabling Statute
1. The APA's Definition of "Rule"
In a concurring opinion, Justice Scalia agreed that the Medicare Act
does not authorize retroactive rulemaking.145 In addition, he specifically
addressed the APA issue. 146 Justice Scalia made explicit the Court's im-
plicit holding that retroactive rulemaking is not a "permissible form of




For him, the APA independently proscribes retroactive rulemaking.
Justice Scalia began by examining the APA's definition of "rule." Be-
cause section 551(4) of the APA defines "rule" as "[t]he whole or part of
an agency statement of general or particular applicability and future ef-
fect designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy ... ,"148
the concurring Justice concluded that "[t]he only plausible reading ... is
that rules have legal consequences only for the future."' 49 He accord-
ingly rejected the government's argument that "future effect" refers
merely to a rule's future effective date and does not prohibit retroactive
rulemaking as a matter of law. 5' Justice Scalia maintained that blurring
the extraordinary step of retroactive rulemaking is crucial, all it need do is persuade Congress of that
fact to obtain the necessary ad hoc authorization." 109 S. Ct. at 480 (Scalia, J., concurring).
143. 307 U.S. 183 (1939).
144. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
145. 109 S. Ct. at 475 (Scalia, J., concurring).
146. See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
147. 109 S. Ct. at 480 (Scalia, J., concurring).
148. 5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (1988) (emphasis added).
149. 109 S. Ct. at 475-76 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citing 5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (the APA's definition
of "rule")).
150. The government asserted that "future effect" did nothing more than distinguish rules from
orders. Brief for the Petitioner at 24, Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 109 S. Ct. 468 (1988) (No.
87-1097). Instead, the government construed "future effect" to mean "future enforcement." Id.
Thus, according to the government, a rule cannot be enforced until an agency brings an enforcement
proceeding, and if Congress intended to prohibit rules from affecting past transactions or events, it
could have so provided. Id. at 25.
The government asserted that " '[w]hat distinguishes legislation from adjudication is that the for-
mer... must be applied in a further proceeding before the legal position of any particular individual
will be definitely touched by it ......."Id. at 24 (quoting J. DICKINSON, ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE
Washington University Open Scholarship
182 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 68:157
the distinction between rules, which have only future effect, and orders,
which may apply both prospectively and retrospectively, would "destroy
the entire dichotomy upon which the most significant portions of the
APA are based." 15'
Justice Scalia's construction of the APA's definition of "rule" is flawed
for several reasons. First, the Justice did not illustrate how the promul-
gation of retroactive rules would impair the APA's structure. His posi-
tion that rules should have only future effect solely focuses upon when a
rule applies and not to what transaction it applies. 52 Nor did Justice
Scalia analyze or consider whether an agency's inability to promulgate a
retroactive rule might actually hinder Congress' intent.
Second, Justice Scalia's evaluation of rules and orders proves too little
because it fails to recognize explicitly that rules, like orders, can apply to
only one party as well as a whole class.' 53 Rather than distinguishing
AND THE SUPREMACY OF LAW 21 (1927)) (emphasis added). The government also relied on the
notion that administrative regulations "lay down general rules and leave them to be applied in a later
proceeding to the facts of particular cases." Id. (quoting Davis, Administrative Rules, supra note 2,
at 921) (emphasis added). Cf. Abbott Lab. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 187-93 (1967) (Fortas, J.,
dissenting) (explicating the old view of when an enforcement proceeding should be applied to an
individual).
Scalia correctly pointed out that the government's reading of § 551(4) is too broad because all
agency statements take effect in the future. 109 S. Ct. at 476 (Scalia, J., concurring).
151. Id. at 476. Scalia's argument that Congress did not intend to include retroactive rulemak-
ing under the APA finds some support in the 1947 ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL ON THE AD-
MINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT [hereinafter ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL]. Id. at 476-77.
The Attorney General's Manual, published by the Justice Department, guides agencies in fulfilling
the procedural requirements of the APA. 109 S. Ct. at 477 (Scalia, J., concurring). The document
includes statements that Scalia reiterated in his opinion and that he believes are "out of accord with
the Government's position." Id. According to the Manual,
"'rule' includes agency statements not only of general applicability but also those of partic-
ular applicability applying either to a class or to a single person. In either case, they must
be of future effect, implementing or prescribing future law .... [T]he entire Act is based
upon a dichotomy between rule making and adjudication .... Rule making is agency
action which regulates the future conduct of either groups of persons or a single person; it
is essentially legislative in nature, not only because it operates in the future but also because
it is primarily concerned with policy considerations .... Conversely, adjudication is con-
cerned with past and present rights and liabilities."
Id. at 477 (emphasis in original) (quoting ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL, supra, at 13-14). At
the same time, however, Scalia deemphasized the Attorney General's statement in the Manual that
"[n]othing in this Act precludes the issuance of retroactive rules when otherwise legal and accompa-
nied by the finding required by section 4(c)." Id. (quoting ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL, supra,
at 37). According to Scalia, this statement permits only "secondary retroactivity," which alters the
future legal consequences of past conduct, rather than the retroactivity involved in changing past
legal consequences. Id.
152. See Brief for the Petitioner supra note 150, at 24.
153. See 5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (rule may be "of general or particular applicability"). The Attorney
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rules from orders, it would be more appropriate to weigh the possible
impact of retroactivity on the involved parties against the particular con-
gressional goals. Thus, rather than focusing on the form of agency action
in deciding whether retroactivity is valid, a court's analysis should center
on the agency's substantive decision-whether by adjudication or
rulemaking-to accomplish its legislative mandate. Otherwise, the con-
currence's rigid dichotomy might thwart an agency's discretionary judg-
ment in efficiently fulfilling congressional ends. 154
Third, Justice Scalia's argument that rules can apply only in futuro
proves too much. The APA is a procedural enactment that, by design,
imposes no substantive restrictions on agency authority. 155 Moreover, if
Congress intended the APA to prohibit certain agency action, it is un-
likely that it would include such a measure in the statute's definitional
section. The APA simply provides the parameters within which an
agency has flexibility to function. Prohibiting retroactive rulemaking un-
necessarily constricts agency discretion and flexibility necessary to ad-
dress unpredictable governmental issues.
Finally, Justice Scalia's interpretation of "rule" in section 551(4)
should condemn retroactive interpretive rules as well as retroactive legis-
lative rules. 56 Yet, because a retroactive interpretive rule merely ex-
plains existing law, it may be less problematic than a retroactive
legislative rule. 157 Prior to the promulgation of an interpretive rule, af-
fected parties are on notice that the statute exists and are unsure only as
to how the agency interprets the law. Notwithstanding Justice Scalia's
construction of the definition of "rule," he concedes that retroactive in-
terpretive rules may be legitimate.158
General's Manual states that "[r]ule making is agency action which regulates future conduct of
either groups ofpersons or a single person ..... ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL, supra note 151, at
13-14, quoted in Georgetown, 109 S. Ct. at 477 (Scalia, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
154. The APA's judicial review provision inhibits all unscrupulous agency retroactivity, regard-
less of whether the agency acted through rulemaking or adjudication. See 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1988).
Assuming the enabling statute does not expressly require that an agency employ a particular me-
dium, the agency's exercise of its legislative mandate may necessitate a retroactive order or a retroac-
tive rule.
155. The APA sets out procedures by which an agency may act, not limits on the substance of
that action.
156. Although Georgetown involved a legislative rule, Scalia's rationale is not limited to legisla-
tive rules.
157. See supra note 7.
158. 109 S. Ct. at 478 (Scalia, J., concurring). Scalia, however, avoided a literal inconsistency by
characterizing interpretive rulemaking as adjudication. See id. at 478, 479; infra note 170 and ac-
companying text.
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2. Secondary Retroactive Rules
After addressing the APA's definition of "rule," Justice Scalia ex-
cepted from the APA's prohibition rules that have only a "secondary"
retroactive effect.1 59 Secondary retroactive rules, according to his con-
currence, have "exclusively future effect," but may render past transac-
tions "less desirable in the future." 16° The concurring Justice concluded
that secondary retroactivity merits treatment separate from retroactive
rules that "[alter] the past legal consequences of past actions."' 16  He
indicated, however, that "unreasonable" secondary retroactive rules may
have grave consequences and thus may be invalid as "arbitrary or
capricious."
16 2
Justice Scalia may be correct in concluding that secondary retroactive
rules are less intrusive than other types of retroactive rules. Moreover,
retroactive substantive rules may merit greater judicial scrutiny or cau-
tion. Justice Scalia, however, did not illustrate explicitly why secondary
retroactive rules are permissible under the APA.163  Central to his dis-
tinction between secondary retroactive rules and impermissible retroac-
tive rules, therefore, is that § 551(4) of the APA defines a rule as having
future legal effect.
3. Retroactivity Precedent
Rather than utilizing Chenery in the retroactive rulemaking context, as
other courts have done, Justice Scalia simply used it to enunciate the
159. 109 S. Ct. at 477-78 (Scalia, J., concurring).
160. Id. at 477 (citing McNulty, Corporations and the International Conflict of Laws, 55 CALIF.
L. REV. 12, 58-60 (1967), to support his definition of "secondary" retroactivity). For an example of
a secondary retroactive rule, Scalia illustrated that the Treasury Department may promulgate a rule
taxing income from trusts that previously had been nontaxable. Id. While the regulation does not
affect the legal consequences of past transactions, the decision to tax those transactions in the future
makes the past act less desirable, and, therefore, "affects" past transactions.
161. Id. (emphasis in original).
162. Id. Scalia cited two cases that analyzed retroactivity on the basis of reasonableness. These
cases, however, did not establish a separate category of "secondary retroactivity." See National
Ass'n of Indep. Television Producers & Distrib. v. FCC, 502 F.2d 249, 255 (2d Cir. 1974) (applying
balancing test of SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947) to determine that retroactive rule was
unreasonable); General Tel. Co. v. United States, 449 F.2d 846, 863 (5th Cir. 1971) ("[t]hat rules of
general application, though prospective in form, may ascribe consequences to events which occurred
prior to their issuance does not, on that basis alone, invalidate them").
163. Scalia did state in conclusory fashion, however, that it was "erroneous ... to extend this
,reasonableness' inquiry to purported rules that not merely affect past transactions but change what
was the law in the past. Quite simply, a rule is an agency statement 'of future effect,' not 'of future
effect and/or reasonable past effect.' " 109 S. Ct. at 478 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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general differences between rulemaking and adjudication. 1" Justice
Scalia criticized the government's reliance on case law that involved ret-
roactive adjudication. In particular, he stated that "[t]he profound con-
fusion characterizing the Government's approach to [retroactive rules] is
exemplified by its reliance upon [SEC v. Chenery Corp.]. 1 65
Justice Scalia next rejected the government's reliance on a pre-APA
case, Addison v. Holly Hill Fruit Products, Inc.,166 in which the Supreme
Court upheld retroactive rulemaking. 67 In his view, Addison "does not
stand for a general authority to issue retroactive rules before the APA
was enacted, much less for authority to do so in the face of [the
APA]." 168 He found it unclear whether the Addison Court required the
agency to act by order or rule. 169 According to Justice Scalia, Addison
did not involve an original legislative rule, but rather an interpretive
rule."1° Thus, he concluded, Addison may simply stand for the proposi-
164. Id. According to Scalia, Chenery and NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759 (1969),
which suggested that adjudication could not have a purely prospective effect, establish the" 'dichot-
omy between rulemaking and adjudication' upon which 'the entire [APA] is based.'" 109 S. Ct. at
478 (quoting ATrORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL, supra note 151, at 14). See supra note 114.
165. 109 S. Ct. at 478 (Scalia, J., concurring). See Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 150, at 16-
17, 36-37 (citing Chenery, 332 U.S. 194 (1947)). To the contrary, the government maintained that
Chenery provided a workable balancing test for weighing the permissibility of retroactive rules. Id.
The Chenery Court, which upheld the retroactive application of law in the context of adjudication,
provided that a reviewing court should balance the need for retroactivity against "the mischief of
producing a result which is contrary to a statutory design or to legal or equitable principles. If that
mischief is greater than the ill effect of the retroactive application of a new standard, it is not the type
of retroactivity which is condemned by law." 332 U.S. at 203. Other courts have followed Chenery
in the rulemaking context as well. See supra note 114.
166. 322 U.S. 607 (1944). See supra notes 68-79 and accompanying text.
167. 109 S. Ct. at 478-79 (Scalia, J., concurring). Scalia recognized that the Court has never
addressed whether the APA "authorizes" retroactive rules and sharply concluded that, "[i]f so obvi-
ously useful an instrument was available to the agencies, one would expect that [the Court] would
have had occasion to review its exercise." Id. at 478. To counter such a conclusion, the government
cited two federal court of appeals cases, Citizens to Save Spencer County v. EPA, 600 F.2d 844
(D.C. Cir. 1979) (sustaining a retroactive regulation under the Clean Air Act) and National Helium
Corp. v. FEA, 569 F.2d 1137, 1145 n. 18 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App.) (created in 1977) (finding a retro-
active rule had no substantial detriment and was reasonable under the circumstances). See Brief for
the Petitioner, supra note 150, at 21-22. Scalia concluded from the government's limited citation of
cases sustaining retroactive regulations that retroactive rulemaking is "evidently not a device indis-
pensable to efficient government." Id. at 480. However, these are not the only cases endorsing
retroactive rulemaking since the enactment of the APA. See supra notes 90-96, 100 and accompany-
ing text.
168. 109 S. Ct. at 478 (Scalia, J., concurring).
169. Id. at 479.
170. Id. For a discussion of the distinction between interpretive and legislative rules, see supra
note 7.
Washington University Open Scholarship
186 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
tion that an agency may adjudicate retroactively when "an interpretive
rule is held invalid, and there is no pre-existing rule which it super-
seded." 171 Alternatively, Justice Scalia asserted, Addison stands for the
narrow proposition that Congress implicitly may authorize retroactive
rulemaking where the agency would be contravening prior law through
either action or inaction. 17
2
Justice Scalia's assessment that Addison involved an interpretive rule is
questionable. In defining "area of production," the rule at issue in Addi-
son had the substantive effect of a law because the congressionally dele-
gated authority to define the statutory exemption-"area of
production"- effectively included authority to determine who was and
was not exempt from the Fair Labor Standards Act. 173 Whether the Ad-
ministrator in Addison acted through either legislative rulemaking or in-
terpretive rulemaking essentially does not change the impact the rule had
on industry. 174
Justice Scalia's treatment of Addison might be more understandable if
that case were an isolated instance in which the Court tolerated retroac-
tive rulemaking. However, the concurrence neglected to refer to the eq-
uitable principles the Court stressed in the Atlantic Coast Line, Morgan,
and Addison cases in sustaining retroactive rulemaking.77 Addison may
be a unique case, but equity does not embrace general rules. Instead,
equity calls for case-by-case discretionary assessments based upon no-
tions of fairness.176 Therefore, Justice Scalia's attempt to narrow Addi-
son to its facts overlooks its broader impact on the importance of
equitable principles in assessing retroactivity.
171. 109 S. Ct. at 479 (Scalia, J., concurring). Cf. Sam v. United States, 682 F.2d 925, 932 (Cl.
Ct. 1982) (retroactive regulation reciting prior law proper, while retroactivity of regulation overrul-
ing prior policy ineffective without presence of certain factors).
172. 109 S. Ct. at 479 (Scalia, J., concurring). The Court would either be ordering the agency to
rule retroactively-contrary to prior law--or to leave "area of production" undefined, removing one
type of exemption contrary to the statute. See supra notes 70-71 and accompanying text.
173. Cf. NLRB v. Wyman-Gorman, 394 U.S. 759 (1969) (considering the delegated authority to
define the term "employee" a rulemaking function).
174. 109 S. Ct. at 479 (Scalia, J., concurring). In short, Scalia assessed the Addison situation as
calling for one of two results: either the Administrator had to promulgate a retroactive rule and
"contravene normal law," or he had to abstain and thereby totally eliminate the congressionally
prescribed exemption. Id.
175. See supra notes 51-78 and accompanying text. The government apparently did not brief
these cases. See 109 S. Ct. at 478.




4. Analogy to Retroactive Legislation
Finally, Justice Scalia rejected the government's contention that retro-
active rulemaking is analogous to retroactive legislation.17 7 Although
the Court has held that retroactive legislation is constitutional if reason-
able under the circumstances, '7 8 Justice Scalia rejected this as a valid
basis for permitting retroactive rulemaking under the APA. He empha-
sized that the issue was not the constitutionality of retroactive rules, but
"rather whether there is any good reason to doubt that the APA means
what it says."' 17 9 Hence, Scalia concluded that, without special congres-
sional authorization, agencies cannot promulgate retroactive
regulations. 180
IV. CONCLUSION
On one level, Georgetown constitutes a sharp break from the older ret-
roactivity case law described in Part II. Those cases conceded that agen-
cies had the authority to promulgate retroactive rules, differing only as to
their understanding of the deference courts owe agencies in allowing spe-
cific instances of retroactivity.' 8 ' In Georgetown, on the other hand, the
Supreme Court decided that agencies lack the very authority-absent an
express congressional grant-to promulgate such rules. 82 On another
level, however, this recent decision falls into line with those earlier cases,
albeit at one extreme. The Court in Georgetown presented a rule of statu-
tory construction for interpreting the authority Congress gives agencies
to rulemake retroactively. Like the earlier cases-and unlike Justice
Scalia's Georgetown concurrence' 8 3-this disposition dictates the rela-
tionship between an agency and a court.' 84 As proof of this assertion,
177. 109 S. Ct. at 479 (Scalia, J., concurring).
178. See supra notes 83-89 and accompanying text.
179. 109 S. Ct. at 479 (Scalia, J., concurring). Given the doubt cast on Justice Scalia's reading of
the APA see supra notes 149-63 and accompanying text, and the merit to the argument that Con-
gress can authorize an agency to do whatever Congress can do, this conclusion appears somewhat
cursory.
180. Id. at 480.
181. See supra notes 80-96 and accompanying text.
182. See supra notes 134-37 and accompanying text.
183. Whereas the Court dealt with the question Georgetown presented through a rule of statu-
tory construction, Scalia chose to rest his concurrence on the APA, Congress' general authorization
to agencies. See supra notes 145-51, 159-62 and accompanying text. This ground necessarily impli-
cates the relationship between Congress and the agency, rather than between the Court and the
agency.
184. The earlier cases, resting their decisions on the equities or due process, see supra notes 51-78
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nothing in Georgetown indicates that Congress can change the Court's
mind with regard to this rule.185
Should the Court recognize and regret the sweeping nature of its
Georgetown decision, the question would remain where to draw the line
in deference to agency retroactivity. Given the potentially harsh conse-
quences of retroactive rules, an abuse of discretion test might require an
agency to bear the burden of justifying a rule's retroactivity.' 86 This
standard also would require that the agency, in its administrative record,
articulate some rational basis for the retroactivity.187 Nevertheless, ret-
roactive rules are often the most efficient, fairest way to alleviate a prob-
lem unforeseen by the agency.' 88 Additionally, every prior Supreme
Court treatment of retroactive rules displayed a much greater willingness
to work with the agency in producing a fair result. 89 In that their poten-
tial for inequity does not far exceed the same potential in retroactive ad-
judications, retroactive rules should be subject to little more judicial
scrutiny. Less deference to the agency's decision-with Georgetown's po-
sition at the extreme-strips agencies of one of their carefully utilized
and most effective tools in carrying out their statutory mandate.
Richard J. Wolf
and accompanying text, involved the relationship between the agency and the court: each answered
the question what can the agency do within the limit set and enforced by the court. Similarly, the
Georgetown Court established a rule of statutory construction, which reveals how a court must treat
an agency's authority.
185. Because the Court's opinion is not based on the APA, Congress seemingly could not alter
this rule of construction even if it chose to do so. Thus, in the wake of Georgetown to grant every
agency retroactive rulemaking authority, Congress would have to amend every agency's organic
statute.
The peculiarities of the Court's opinion, see supra notes 138-44 and accompanying text, might give
one pause to wonder whether it would not be overruled or seriously limited given a retroactivity
amendment to the APA.
186. See Mason Gen. Hosp. v. Department of HHS, 809 F.2d 1220, 1225 (6th Cir. 1987).
187. Under this test there would be a presumption of validity, but the reviewing court should
accept the agency's post hoc rationalizations only with the utmost skepticism. As a general rule, the
reviewing court should accept only contemporaneous views in the record. See Overton Park v.
Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 419 (1971) (post hoc rationalizations are not part of the "whole record"); supra
note 10.
188. See supra notes 24-32 and accompanying text.
189. See supra notes 51-79 and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme Court decisions in
Atlantic Coast Line, Morgan, and Addison).
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